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trol could thus be achieved and maintained with a minimal amount
of friction between the EPA and the states.
KATHERINE LEE BISHOP

IX.

EVIDENCE

Voiceprints Admissible as a Sole Means of Identification
Scientific evidence has become a useful tool in criminal trials,'
but an increase in new methods and techniques has necessitated a
reconsideration of the viability of such evidence. The admission of
scientific evidence poses three dangers to insuring criminal justice.'
First, because scientific evidence has an aura of certainty, a jury may
accord it undue weight.3 Second, because scientific evidence is generally beyond the comprehension of lay people, it might confuse or
mislead a jury to the point of totally rejecting the evidence.' Third,
the scientific evidence offered through expert testimony may be insufficiently removed from the knowledge of the average juror,5 and
the expert may not be properly qualified in a particular field to assist
the jury in its search for truth.'
of the Clean Air Amendments. Congress plainly intended the federal
statute and regulations promulgated thereunder to take precedence
over state laws and regulations. By enabling the Administrator to
insert his own regulations in a state plan, it provided him with the
needed authority to substitute appropriate provisions for inappropriate ones. Thereafter, as legal components of the state plan, the
Administrator's regulations may be both federally and locally enforced; violations thereof are violations of a state plan. § 1857c8(a)(1); see §§ 1857c-7(d)(1), 1857c-9(b).
Civ. No. 74-1013 at 282.
1 For example, both ballistics evidence and fingerprint identifications have received wide judicial approval. See, e.g., A. MOENSSENS, R. MOSES & E. INAU, SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 147, 327 (1973)[hereinafter cited as MoENssENs].
2 See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 203 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited
as MCCORMICK]. See generally MOENSSENS supra note 1; J. RICHARDSON, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1974); Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 1 (1970).
3 MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 202 at 485.
' MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 202 at 487. See also Note, Evolving Method of
Scientific Proof, 13 N.Y.L.F. 677, 684-86 (1967).
5 MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 13 at 29. See also Fineberg v. United States, 393
F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1968).
6 MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 13 at 30. See also Fineberg v. United States, 393
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The test developed to protect against the dangers of scientific
7
evidence in criminal trials was announced in Frye v. United States:
scientific evidence will be admissible when it has achieved general
acceptance by the relevant scientific community.' One scientific
technique which has recently received extensive judicial treatment,
and has prompted a reconsideration of the Frye test, is voice spectrographic analysis - "voiceprints." 9 This process involves the use of
electronic "pictures" of a voice to identify the speaker. While the
admissibility of voiceprints has received varied treatment by the
courts,10 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently took a particuF.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1968).
7 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
' In sustaining the rejection of polygraph evidence, the court in Frye stated:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must
be recognized, and while the courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle
or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Id. at 1014. Compare McCoRMICK, supra note 2, § 203 at 491. State courts also have
followed the Frye rule. See, e.g., People v. Alston, 79 Misc.2d 1077, 362 N.Y.S.2d 356
(Sup. Ct. 1974).
1 The term "voiceprint" is a misnomer, since it implies a status of reliability
comparable to that of fingerprints. United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 465 n.1 (4th
Cir. 1975). The voiceprint technique involves an electronic device (sound spectrograph)
which records responses to several components of speech, thus producing a "picture"
of the voice called a voice spectrogram. Based on the theory that each individual
uniquely produces certain basic sounds, an expert observer can identify a speaker by
comparing his voice spectrogram with that of an "unknown" speaker while aurally
comparing the voices. In this manner, the examiner can determine whether the
"known" and "unknown" speakers are the same person. For a discussion of voice
spectrographic analysis, see Kamine, The Voiceprint Technique: Its Structure and
Reliability, 6 SAN DIEGo L. Rv. 213 (1969). See also Kersta, Speaker Recognition and
Identification by Voiceprints, 40 CONN. B.J. 586 (1966); Comment, The Evidentiary
Value of Spectrographic Voice Identification, 63 J. CRIM. C. & P.S. 343, 343-48 (1972).
The two primary proponents of voice spectrographic analysis are Lawrence G. Kersta,
an electrical engineer and physicist, and Dr. Oscar I. Tosi, a speech and phonetic
professor Michigan State University. See, Hennessey & Romig, A Review of Experiments Involving Voiceprint Identification, 16 J. FoR. Sci. 183 (1971); Kamine, The
Voiceprint Technique, supra; Comment, The Evidentiary Value of Spectrographic
Voice Identification,supra; Comment, Voiceprints: The End of the Yellow Brick Road,
8 U.S.F.L. REv. 702 (1974).
," For cases admitting voiceprint identifications, see United States v. Baller, 519
F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1975); United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
422 U.S. 1042 (1975); United States v. Sample, 378 F. Supp. 44 (E.D. Pa. 1974); United
States v. Wright, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 183, 37 C.M.R. 477 (1967); Hodo v. Superior Court,
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larly liberal approach to the adminsibility of spectrographic analysis
and the application of the Frye test.
In United States v. Bailer,"'the Fourth Circuit upheld the admissibility of voice spectrographic identification. The defendant, Baller,
made a series of telephoned bomb threats to a West Virginia coal
mine. Authorities at the mine recorded and traced these calls to
Baller. Subsequent to his arrest, the police obtained exemplars of
Bailer's voice, which were sent for spectrographic analysis with the
recorded bomb threats to Lt. Ernest Nash, an expert voiceprint exwhich
aminer. At the trial, Lt. Nash provided expert testimony
2
linked Baller's voice with three of the bomb threats.'
On appeal, Baller claimed that Lt. Nash's testimony should not
have been admitted because the technique upon which it was based
failed to satisfy the Frye test. 13 In upholding admission of Nash's
testimony, the Fourth Circuit applied a liberal test'4 instead of the
Frye test. The court's test presents difficulties regarding its application to the admissibility of voice spectrographic analysis as a means
of identification.
The court's reliance on prior judicial treatment of voiceprint identification 5 ignored several significant aspects of those decisions. The
30 Cal. App. 3d 778, 106 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1973); United States v. Brown, 13 Crim. L.
Rptr. 2203 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1973); Alea v. State, 265 So. 2d 96 (Fla. App. 1972); Worley
,
Mass. v. State, 263 So. 2d 613 (Fla. App. 1972); Commonwealth v. Vitello, Mass. -,
327 N.E.2d 671
327 N.E.2d 819 (1975); Commonwealth v. Lykus, (1975); State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971). For
cases not admitting voiceprints, see, United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir
1974), af'g on other grounds sub nom, United States v. Raymond, 337 F. Supp. 641
(D.D.C. 1972); People v. Law, 40 Cal. App. 3d 75, 114 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1974); People v.
King, 266 Cal. 2d 437, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1968); People v. Chapter, 13 Crim. L. Rptr.
2479 (Super. Ct., Marin Cty., 1973); State v. Cary, 49 N.J. 343, 230 A.2d 384 (1967),
on remand, 99 N.J. Super. 323, 239 A.2d 680 (1968), remanded, 54 N.J. 256, 250 A.2d
15 (1969), aff'd, 56 N.J. 16, 264 A.2d 209 (1970).
" 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1975).
,zId. at 464.
13Id.
'1

Id. at 466.

'1 The court noted that "most" pre-1971 cases excluded voiceprint evidence be-

cause the technique had not been generally accepted as reliable by the relevant scientific community. Id. at 465. See People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 72 Cal. Rptr.
478 (1968); State v. Cary, 56 N.J. 16, 264 A.2d 209 (1970). In both King and Cary, the
courts held that testimony by Kersta in support of the voiceprint technique was insufficient in light of the overwhelming negative expert testimony, including that of Dr.
Tosi. Both courts found that the technique lacked general acceptance by the relevant
scientific community. However, in United States v. Wright, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 183, 37
C.M.R. 447 (1967), where voiceprint identifications were admitted, the Court of Military Appeals held that since the voice tapes were actually before the trial court for
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court disregarded the purposes for which other courts have admitted
voiceprint identifications. Most cases upholding admissibility allowed the evidence only for corroboration of aural identifications, not
as conclusive evidence of a defendant's identity.'6 Although the Bailer
court briefly discussed aurally-made identifications, 7 it based identification of the appellant directly upon the results of the spectroaural comparison, admission of Kersta's testimony was permitted. The court considered any shortcomings in Kersta's qualifications and the technique's reliability insignificant. A vigorous dissent argued persuasively that the court had not applied Frye
and that the evidence was "absolutely devoid of proof of any general acceptance of
mechanical and electronic voice identification devices by the scientific community."
17 U.S.C.M.A. 182, 193 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
The Fourth Circuit also stressed that two other circuit courts had divided on the
voiceprint issue and that a "majority of state courts" had held such identifications
admissible. 519 F.2d at 465-466. In conjunction with these state appellate court decisions, the court remarked that New Jersey, which previously excluded such evidence,
now favors admissibility, in an apparent reference to State v. Andretta, 61 N.J. 544,
296 A.2d 644 (1972). The court's reading of that case, as evidenced by this broad
assertion of admissibility, strains its credibility. The New Jersey court did not hold
voiceprints admissible, but merely deferred consideration of the technique until the
trial court had resolved the issue.
18 See United States v. Sample, 378 F. Supp. 44 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (corroborative of
other witnesses' aural identifications and the court's own aural comparison of the
defendant's voice with tapes of the unknown speaker); Alea v. State 265 So. 2d 96 (Fla.
App. 1972) ("As in Worley v. State. . . there was other substantial evidence to identify appellant as the perpetrator of the crime." Id. at 98); Worley v. State, 263 So. 2d
613 (Fla. App. 1972); Commonwealth v. Vitello, - Mass. -,
327 N.E.2d 819
Mass. -,
327 N.E.2d 671 (1975)(6 of 8
(1975); Commonwealth v. Lykus, witnesses had made aural identifications of defendant from taped telephone calls);
State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971). In Worley,
police, after receiving two telephoned bomb threats, apprehended appellant near the
phone booth from which the calls had been made. Subsequently, appellant's fingerprints were found in the booth and the officer receiving the calls aurally identified the
appellant's voice. In reviewing the voiceprint technique, the court applied a test less
strict than Frye. See MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 203 at 491, and text accompanying
notes 33-36 infra. The court held that:
[Tihe evidence against the defendant was already ample to sustain
his conviction, even without the use of voiceprints. Therefore, this
decision must be limited by [its] facts. We hold voiceprints were
properly admitted to corroborate defendant's identification by other
means.
263 So.2d at 614 (emphasis added). The court declined to consider the issue of admissibility of voiceprints as a sole means of identification since that issue was not before
the court. Id.
The admissibility of aural identifications is undisputed because of its similarity
to eye-witness identifications. See, e.g., State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, 192 N.W.2d
at 435.
1"519 F.2d at 466-67.
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graphic analysis.' The Fourth Circuit also ignored the procedural
context of two cases upon which it relied." 9 Each case was an administrative proceeding rather than a criminal trial. Both courts noted that
the standard of proof under these circumstances was lower than that
in a criminal trial and, therefore, voiceprints could be admitted for
corroborative purposes without prejudice. 0
The court's perfunctory analysis of the prior judicial history of the
voiceprint issue led to a more liberal test than that in Frye. The court
achieved this result by admitting the scientific evidence on the same
basis as expert testimony and permitting its weight to be attacked
before the jury.' Although the comparison of scientific evidence to
expert testimony for testing admissibility has gained support,2 the
Fourth Circuit's failure to recognize certain factors in such a comparison weakened its own rationale in upholding the admissibility of the
voiceprints.
Because any scientific opinion has an aura of certainty, a jury may
accord it "undue weight." 2 Therefore, the judge must initially determine whether the evidence deserves such weight before permitting
the jury to consider the evidence. The Fourth Circuit, however, noted
that absolute certainty was not a prerequisite to admissibility.24 Al" Id. at 464-65, 467. Two courts warned against the use of voiceprints absent any
other means of establishing identity. See Worley v. State, 263 So. 2d 613, 614-15 (Fla.
App. 1972); Commonwealth v. Lykus, Mass. , 327 N.E.2d 671, 679 (1975).
11 United States v. Sample, 378 F. Supp. 44 (E.D. Pa. 1974); State ex rel. Trimble
v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971).
20 In Sample, the district court considered the government's motion for the revocation of parole. Noting that such a proceeding required a standard of proof lower than
that for a criminal trial, the court held the voiceprint technique sufficiently reliable
for purposes of that particular proceeding and only for corroborative purposes. In
Trimble, the Minnesota Supreme Court held voiceprints admissible for purposes of
justifying issuance of a search and arrest warrant. In dicta, the court noted that
voiceprints would probably be admissible only to corroborateaural identifications.
2, The Fourth Circuit stated that "the admissibility of spectrographic identification turns primarily on whether [the theory of invariant speech] has been sufficiently
proved to allow a jury to give the evidence whatever weight it sees fit." 519 F.2d at
465. Some courts have held that "sufficiently proved" is something less than "general
acceptance." See, e.g., Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. App. 1968). One commentator has argued that the standard for admissibility should be "reasonable reliability." Boyce, JudicialRecognition of Scientific Evidence in CriminalCases, 8 UTAH L.
REV. 313 (1962).
22 See, e.g., United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973). See generally,
MOENSSENS, supra note 1; Note, Evolving Methods of Scientific Proof, 13 N.Y.L.F. 677
(1967).
21 519 F.2d at 466. See United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973);
Luchetti, The Voiceprint Technique: How Reliable is Reliable?, 63 ILL. B.J. 229 (1975).
20 519 F.2d at 466.

1976]

FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

though cases admitting the voiceprint for corroborative purposes
only5 have acknowledged this lower standard, the implication in each
decision is that the admission of voiceprints as a sole means of identification requires a higher standard of reliability." The Fourth Circuit's test, unlike the Frye standard, fails to guarantee the presence
of this higher level of reliability achieved by requiring that the scientific technique gain the general acceptance of experts in the field to
which it relates. Moreover, scientific evidence is, by its very nature
and requisite expertise, difficult to rebut. Therefore, the Bailer court
reasoned that a proper procedure must exist for insuring adequate
rebuttal of any proffered scientific evidence. While adequacy of rebuttal under Bailer depends on counsel's competence in introducing
such evidence," the Frye test objectively insures this adequacy by
requiring that the scientific community must accept the technique
before it is admissible.2 Despite these two dangers, the Fourth Circuit held that voiceprint evidence should be admitted on the same
9
basis as other expert testimony.
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit overlooked the requirements for
the admissibility of expert testimony. A basic prerequisite to the
introduction of expert testimony is a demonstration that any "process
used as an intermediate [to determine an ultimate fact] is trustworthy and reliable." 0 This insures that the trial judge will determine
, See text accompanying notes 15-18 supra.
26 See, e.g., Worley v. State, 263 So. 2d 613, 614-15 (Fla. App. 1972); Commonwealth v. Lykus, Mass. -,
327 N.E.2d 671, 679 (1975); State ex rel. Trimble
v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432, 434 (1971).
21519 F.2d at 466. Such an approach is very subjective because the procedure
contemplates merely providing a pool of experts with no initial determination of the
technique's reliability.
' See Comment, The Voiceprint Dilemma: Should Voices Be Seen and Not
Heard?, 35 MD. L. REv. 267, 276, 290-91 (1975).
21 519 F.2d at 466. The court cited United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971). In Stifel, the Sixth Circuit purported to apply
Frye in admitting neutron activation analysis, but then noted that admission of the
evidence was for the discretion of the judge, after which the jury could weigh the
quality of the evidence. 433 F.2d at 433-439. The court appeared to relax the Frye test
while purporting to apply it.
30 MOENSSENS, supra note 1, at 3. Voice spectography is just such an "intermediate." See MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 13 at 31. A second prerequisite is that the fact
to be inferred from the testimony must be beyond the experience of the juror. See, e.g.,
Fineberg v. United States, 393 F.2d 417, 421 (9th Cir. 1968). See generallyMOENSSENS,
supra note 1. The final prerequisite is that the knowledge possessed by the testifying
expert must be sufficiently extensive and specialized such that his opinion will probably aid the jurors in their search for truth. 393 F.2d at 421. Both Dr. Tosi and Lt. Nash
have qualified as experts in the post-1971 cases.
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the reliability of the scientific technique upon which the offered expert testimony is based before submitting it to the jury. The test
utilized in Bailer, however, overlooked this requirement. The Fourth
Circuit held that the jury should be permitted to determine the
weight of the voiceprint testimony. -However, the scientific evidence
upon which that testimony is based must be reliable. Such a determination must be made by the judge before placing the evidence before
the jury. 3' Thus, the Baler court ignored the expert testimony admissibility requirement, and its similarity to the Frye standard, and held
that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by permitting the jury
to consider the reliability of the voiceprint technique because he
"adequately guarded against dangers inherent in the use of newly
'32
discovered scientific tests.
The Fourth Circuit noted the extensive voir dire examination of
the voiceprint technique as supporting the judge's action. 33 However,
the court failed to make the in-depth analysis which characterized
prior judicial evaluations of the technique's reliability.3 4 Despite the
absence of any new evidence as to the technique's reliability, the
court concluded that evidential misuse of the voiceprint technique
was prevented by the availability of experts to rebut the principle
underlying the technique.3 5 Such an observation, however, does not
resolve the necessary judicial determination of the technique's reliability. Significantly, only two experts in the field of voiceprint identification have testified in unequivocal support of the technique's reliability.3 Relying on that testimony, the Fourth Circuit concluded that
31See Comment, Voiceprints - The Admissibility Question: What Evidentiary
StandardShould Apply?, 19 ST. Louis U.L. REV. 509, 527-528 (1975).
32 519 F.2d at 466. For discussion of the court's perception of the dangers inherent
in the use of new scientific tests, see text accompanying notes 23-28 supra.
'3 519 F.2d at 466.
See, e.g., People v. Law, 40 Cal. App. 3d 75, 114 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1974); Commonwealth v. Lykus, - Mass. __,
327 N.E.2d 671 (1975). One commentator has noted
a "snowball effect" among the jurisdictions which have considered the voiceprint issue.
Jones, Evidence Vel Non: The Non Sense of Voiceprint Identification, 62 Ky. L.J. 301,
302 (1974).
11 But see United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See
also Comment, The Voiceprint Dilemma: Should Voices Be Seen and Not Heard?, 35
MD. L. REV. 267, 290-91 (1975).
"' Dr. Tosi and Kersta are the two experts who have given unequivocal supportive
testimony. See note 9 supra. Another expert, Dr. Ladefoged, has given only qualified
support to the technique's reliability. See United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), aff'g on othergrounds sub nom., United States v. Raymond, 337 F. Supp.
641 (D.D.C. 1972). Lt. Nash has qualified merely as an expert examiner of voice
spectrograms, although he has been questioned for support of the technique's admis-
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the technique's reliability had been sufficiently demonstrated to permit its consideration by the jury.
Furthermore, the Bailer court concluded that the trial judge's jury
instructions adequately protected against the dangers inherent in
scientific evidence. The instruction which permitted the jury to disregard Lt. Nash's opinion if it determined that the voiceprint technique
was not sufficiently reliable, accurate, and dependable, '7 allowed the
jury to make a decision which the judge should have made. Such an
instruction ignored the prerequisites for introducing expert testimony 8 and the dangers in initially exposing the jury to scientific
evidence. 9 Moreover, the instruction that permitted the jury to disregard Lt. Nash's testimony if it ascertained that the reasons supporting the testimony were unsound or of doubtful reliability" also allowed the judge to abdicate his responsibility of determining the
trustworthiness and reliability of the process used." Based on these
instructions, the court found that determination of the voiceprint
technique's reliability and soundness could be safely left to the jury."
sion. The use of Kersta as an expert on the technique's reliability is questionable. See
People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1968); Note, Voiceprint
Identifications, 61 GEO. L.J. 703, 724 (1973).
-"519 F.2d at 467.
3 The scientific technique upon which the expert testimony is based must be
reliable. See text accompanying notes 30-32 supra. There is doubt whether the technique is reliable. See Jones, Evidence Vel Non: The Non Sense of Voiceprint
Identification, 62 Ky. L.J. 301, 316 (1974).
31The dangers inherent in scientific evidence are the aura of certainty surrounding
such evidence, its tendency to confuse or mislead the jury, and the possibility of the
testifying expert having insufficient qualifications. See text accompanying notes 2-6
supra. The judge had a duty to determine that the reliability of the technique was
sufficient to permit a jury to accord it the "undue weight" which scientific evidence
carries. To consider the determination of reliability a factual question violates that
duty. See text accompanying notes 30-32 supra.
40 519 F.2d at 467.
' See text accompanying note 30 supra. Establishing the reliability required to
prove the "soundness" of the theory of invariant speech necessitates general acceptance by the relevant scientific community, which is a determination to be made initially by the judge. A determination of reliability or "soundness" means that the
technique has been empirically tested by a number of scientists within the relevant
scientific community. If a sufficient number of scientists have had a very high degree
of positive results to the test, then the technique will be deemed reliable. Such a
determination is merely an application of the Frye test. See, e.g., Comment,
Voiceprints - The Admissibility Question: What Evidentiary Standard Should
Apply?, 19 ST. Louis U.L. REv. 509, 526 (1975).
42 A basic prerequisite for admitting expert testimony is that the offered testimony
must be beyond the experience and knowledge of the average juror. See text accompanying note 30 supra.The court strained its credulity in expecting the jury to weigh the
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The test used by the Bailer court failed to protect adequately
against the dangers of admitting voiceprints. Under this test, the
issue of the voiceprint technique's reliability was placed before the
jury before utilizing the voiceprint results as the sole determinant of
Baller's identity. Since the courts which have considered the introduction of voiceprint identifications have admitted the evidence for
corroborative purposes only, 3 the propriety of placing the reliability
issue before the jury is questionable when voiceprints are used for
direct identification.
The admissibility test formulated by the Bailer court does not
obviate the necessity for an initial ascertainment of the scientific
technique's reliability. Such a determination is especially necessary
in the case of voiceprint identifications because of the doubt remaining within the scientific community concerning the reliability of identifications based upon spectrographic analysis.4 Moreover, even
those courts that have admitted voiceprint identification testimony
for corroborative purposes only have indicated that admission of voiceprints as a sole means of identification should be subject to a higher
standard of reliability." This higher standard increases the necessity
for initial judicial determination of the technique's reliability. The
Fourth Circuit, however, permitted a jury determination of the reliability of the technique and therefore the weight of the evidence. Since
the voiceprints were the sole means of identifying Baller, the court
failed to assume fully the responsibility imposed by either the Frye
test or the expert testimony test which it utilized.
SAMUEL J. WEBSTER
expert's testimony and determine the reliability of a technique about which they were

ignorant.
13 See text accompanying notes 16-17 supra.But see United States v. Franks, 511
F.2d 25 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); Hodo v. Superior Court, 30 Cal.
App. 3d 778, 106 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1973).
1 Dr. Tosi noted that continuing research is most desirable, that the technique
has never achieved 100% reliability, that he has always stressed the restrictions on the
technique and the standards that must be maintained, and that ultimately, the technique's reliability depends upon the examiner. See Tosi, Voice'Identification, in
SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL ADVOCACY 241, 267 (Cederbaums & Arnold, eds. 1975). See also, Thomas, Voiceprint - Myth or Miracle, in ScIENTIFIC AND
EXPERT EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL ADVOCACY 273, 328 (Cederbaums & Arnold, eds. 1975);

Jones, Evidence Vel Non: The Non Sense of VoiceprintIdentification, 62 Ky. L.J. 301,
316 (1974); Comment, The Voiceprint Dilemma: Should Voices Be Seen and Not
Heard?, 35 MD. L. REV. 267, 276 (1975).
11See note 16 supra.

